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Abstract—Empirical data shows that in the absence of incentives, a peer participating in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
network wishes to download content, while avoiding to contribute content in return. This phenomenon, known as 
free-riding, has been actively studied in the literature and incentives have been proposed to compel self-interested 
peers to cooperate with each other and contribute their content to other peers in the network. Most solutions for 
providing incentives in P2P networks are based on direct reciprocity, which are effective in networks where the 
peers are interested in the same content (e.g. downloading a large file such as the Linux operating system). However, 
such incentives schemes are not appropriate for most P2P multimedia sharing networks due to the unique features 
exhibited by such networks: large populations of anonymous agents interacting infrequently, asymmetric interests of 
peers, network errors, and multiple concurrent transactions. In this paper, to address these challenges, we design 
and rigorously analyze a new family of incentive protocols that utilizes indirect reciprocity and it is based on the 
design of efficient social norms. In the proposed P2P protocols, the social norms consist of a social strategy, which 
represents the rule prescribing to the peers when they should or should not provide content to other peers based on 
their own reputation as well as the reputation of the requesting peers, and a reputation scheme, which rewards or 
punishes peers depending on whether they comply or not with the social strategy. We first define the concept of a 
sustainable social norm, under which no peer has an incentive to deviate. We then formulate the problem of 
designing optimal social norms, which selects the social norm that maximizes the network performance among all 
sustainable social norms. We study the structure of optimal social norms and specifically determine for peers of a 
certain reputation whether they will need to serve peers of a specific reputation and whether, in turn, they would be 
able to receive service from that reputation or not. In particular, we show that, given the network and peers’ 
characteristics, social norms can be designed which deter free-riders by reducing their reputation and thus, the 
service which they receive from the P2P network. Hence, we prove that it becomes in the self-interest of peers to 
contribute their content to the network rather than to free-ride. We also show the importance of designing optimal 
social norms rather than just selecting a sustainable social norm in an ad-hoc manner. We also investigate the 
impact of various punishment schemes on the social welfare as well as how should the optimal social norms be 
designed if altruistic and malicious peers are active in the network. Our results show that optimal social norms are 
capable of providing significant improvements in the sharing efficiency of multimedia P2P networks. 
Keywords- Multimedia sharing, Peer-to-Peer networks, Incentive design, Indirect reciprocity, Social norms, 
Reputation schemes. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the explosion of communication technologies and multimedia signal processing, the sharing of 
multimedia content is becoming increasingly popular over the Internet. In particular, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
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multimedia applications represent a large majority of the traffic currently exchanged over the Internet. By 
pooling together the resources of many autonomous devices, P2P networks are able to provide a scalable 
and low-cost platform for disseminating large files without relying on a centralized infrastructure [1][2]. 
Multimedia sharing systems that have been successfully developed for P2P networks usually use tree-
based or data-driven approaches [4][5]. In this paper, data-driven approaches adopting pull-based 
techniques are considered [4][6], where different types of files are divided into chunks of uniform length 
and are then disseminated over the P2P network. Each peer possesses several chunks, which are shared 
among interested peers, and information about the availability of the chunks is periodically exchanged 
among peers through intermediate trackers. Using this information, peers continuously associate 
themselves with other peers and exchange chunks. 
While this approach has been successfully deployed in various applications over P2P networks, it is 
vulnerable to intrinsic incentive problems since the upload service incurs costs to both the uploader and 
the downloader, but benefits only the downloader [6]. As contributing their content does not generate 
direct benefit, peers tend to avoid uploading while trying to download content from other peers, a 
behavior commonly known as free-riding. 
Such studies demonstrate that designing incentive protocols to encourage cooperation and mitigate 
free-riding is crucial to maintain the performance of P2P multimedia sharing applications. To achieve this 
goal, a large body of research was dedicated to this area [7][8]. Many of these existing mechanisms rely 
on game-theoretical approaches and can be classified into two categories: pricing and reciprocity [9]. 
Pricing mechanisms rely on implementing a currency-based system that is resistant to forgery and 
double-spending [10]. Peers are incentivized to share their content by rewarding them with virtual 
currency for uploading and charging them for downloading. However, such solutions are often very 
cumbersome to deploy because they require an accounting infrastructure to track the transactions of peers, 
which further necessitates the usage of public keys, a web of trust, or threshold cryptography techniques 
[11]. Furthermore, these systems often deploy auctions to set the price, which may result in high delay 
and complexity in order to implement a desirable allocation. 
Another method for providing incentives is based on reciprocity, where the peers’ past reciprocative 
behavior (e.g. contributing content to other peers or not) is rewarded or punished in future interactions 
with the same or other peers. Differential service schemes are deployed in reciprocity-based protocols to 
determine how peers should make their upload decisions: a peer with a higher rating (i.e. a peer that 
exhibited a good past behavior) receives more resources than a peer with a lower rating [12]. Since a peer 
with a high rating is treated preferentially by other peers, incentives are provided for peers to cooperate in 
order to build up high ratings. Depending on how a peer’s rating is generated, reciprocity-based protocols 
can be classified as direct reciprocity (also known as personal reciprocation) and indirect reciprocity (also 
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referred to as societal reciprocation). 
In direct reciprocity, each peer rates a specific peer individually [6]. Hence the interaction between 
two peers is only influenced by their own history of interactions. Though easy to implement, direct 
reciprocity requires frequent interactions between two peers in order to establish accurate mutual ratings, 
which is restrictive in P2P networks characterized by high churn or asymmetry of interests. For example, 
the investigation in [2] shows that over 70% of P2P traffic is exchanged in networks with more than 1000 
peers, which implies that a peer normally interacts with a stranger (i.e. with whom it was randomly 
matched) about whom it has no prior history and with whom it has no expectation to meet again in the 
future. Hence, protocols based on direct reciprocity such as tit-for-tat perform well only in networks 
dominated by long-lived relationships, where peers have ample opportunities to mutually reciprocate, and 
where peers are interested in similar content. 
Due to the random matching feature of large P2P networks, indirect reciprocity becomes a more 
appropriate mechanism in designing incentive protocols. Most protocols based on indirect reciprocity use 
reputation mechanisms [14][15][16]. A peer is globally rated with a reputation calculated by its past 
behavior in the network. In order to make a decision, a peer does not need to know the entire action 
history but the reputation of its opponent. However, the majority of existing works on P2P reputation 
mechanisms are concerned with system design issues and focus on effective information gathering 
techniques which only differ in how the global reputation is calculated and propagated, e.g. efficient 
information aggregation [15], secure peer identification [16], etc. An analytical framework that is able to 
rigorously study how peers can be incentivized to cooperate in P2P networks and what is the resulting 
impact on the network performance when various reputation mechanisms are deployed, is still missing. 
In our past work [22], we developed a rigorous framework for studying reputation mechanisms which 
can be applied to P2P applications. The peers determine their upload services to a specific peer based on 
this peers’ reputation, as well as their own status in the P2P system (i.e. their own reputations). To 
formalize the reputation mechanism, social norms [17], which consist of a social strategy and a reputation 
scheme, are introduced to regulate the behavior of peers. We derived analytically under what conditions 
peers will find in their own self-interest to comply with the prescribed social strategy, and defined and 
solved the protocol designer’s problem of designing an optimal social norm that maximizes the social 
welfare of the network. 
In this paper, we use the theoretical framework developed in [22] to design efficient incentive 
protocols for P2P multimedia sharing services. Hence, we design social norms, which consider the unique 
features and constraints of P2P multimedia sharing services: 
 Asymmetry of interests among peers. In multimedia sharing applications, peers are interested in very 
diverse contents. Hence, a peer providing content to a requesting peer may not be interested in any of 
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the content possessed by this peer, but it may be interested in content available from other peers. To 
accommodate the fact that the peers’ interests are asymmetric, we model the interaction between a 
pair of matched peers as a gift-giving game, instead of a prisoner’s dilemma game, which assumes 
mutual interests between a pair of peers and is widely adopted in traditional analysis of P2P systems. 
 Service errors. The existing literature on incentives for P2P networks [14][15] rarely considers that  
network errors may affect the interactions between peers. This is an idealized assumption which is hard 
to realize in practical networks. In contrast, our work explicitly takes into consideration that the 
exchange of chunks between peers may be subject to service errors and considers how protocols can be 
efficiently designed given the level of network errors. 
 Multiple connections. In multimedia sharing applications over P2P networks, peers can engage in 
multiple simultaneous connections with other peers to exchange chunks in order to increase the 
download efficiency. Hence, we augment the framework in [22] to accommodate sharing using  
multiple connections and explicitly analyze how the number of connections will impact the peers’ 
incentives and the social welfare of the P2P network. 
 Simple protocol designs. Unlike in [22], where our focus is on determining structural results for the 
most efficient social norms irrespective of their resulting implementation and designing complexity, in 
this paper we restrict our attention to a simpler class of social strategies – the set of threshold-based 
strategies, in which peers can receive services only if their reputations are higher than a threshold. 
 Altruistic peers and malicious peers. We also rigorously determine the impact of altruistic peers (who 
always provide upload services to other peers) as well as malicious peers (who upload corrupted data 
to other peers) on the protocol design and the P2P network performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a game-theoretic model for P2P 
multimedia sharing is proposed. In Section III, the problem of designing the optimal incentive protocol is 
formalized and the structure of the optimal protocol is studied. Section IV explicitly investigates the 
impact of altruistic and malicious peers on the performance and robustness of the incentive protocols. 
After showing the simulation results with illustrative examples in Section V and discussing the possible 
future extensions of our work in Section VI, we conclude the paper in Section VII. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Considered P2P networks 
We consider a P2P multimedia sharing network such as Chainsaw [3] and CoolStreaming [4] 1, where 
peers would like to associate themselves with other peers that possess media content in which they are 
interested. The shared media content is coded and divided into media chunks by the content creator. Here 
                                                          
1 The results obtained in this paper can be applied in P2P applications other than multimedia sharing, such as overlay routing and general file 
sharing without change. 
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we define the value (benefit) of a chunk as its dependency factor on other chunks, which represents the 
video distortion reduction on the peer who receives this chunk [25]. In general, both the value and the size 
of a chunk may depend on the priority class to which it belongs to. To make the analysis tractable, we 
assume initially that the multimedia content is encoded such that all the chunks are of equal size and have 
the same value (benefit). In Section VI, we will discuss the case when chunks are classified into different 
priority classes, which are defined based on the specific video encoder used by the content creator (e.g. 
they could be base and enhancement layers like in a scalable video coder; the I, P and B-frames of an 
H.264/AVC codec etc.). 
At any instance, a peer buffers an amount of chunks that can be shared with others, and the trackers 
maintain and update periodically the buffer maps recording the content possession of each peer. We 
consider a discrete-time model, in which time is divided into periods representing the interval between 
two updates of the buffer maps by the trackers. 
We assume that there is a continuum of peers in the network, which is a good practical model for 
large-scale P2P networks [1][14]. When a peer wants to download a certain chunk, it sends a search 
request to the tracker from which it receives a response with the list of peers who have the requested 
content [6]. Then the peer randomly selects a peer from the list to send a service request. The selection is 
uniformly random such that all peers on the list have an equal probability to be chosen [18][20]. At any 
instance, an individual peer can support simultaneously a fixed number of b  download connections, from 
which it downloads chunks it requested from others [6].  
B. The stage game played by a pair of peers 
The interaction between a pair of connected peers exchanging a chunk, which is defined as a 
transaction, can be modelled as a one-stage asymmetric gift-giving game to characterize the asymmetry 
of interests among peers [21]. To avoid confusion, the peer who requests the downloading of a chunk is 
called a client and the peer who is being requested is called a server. In one transaction, the server has the 
choice of selecting its action a  from the set { },= S NS , where S  stands for “Serve”, implying that 
the server responses to the client’s request to upload the chunk; whereas NS  stands for “Not Serve”, 
implying that the server refuses to upload the chunk. The utility matrix of one transaction is illustrated in 
Table 1 which is specified as follows. 
 If a S= , the server consumes an upload cost of c , and the client receives a benefit of r . c  can be 
determined as a composite function of the upload bandwidth and the transmission power spent by the 
server [18]. It should be noted that this cost may be different for various peers, and can vary over time 
and per chunk. In our formal analysis, we consider that c  is constant for each chunk, but our proposed 
framework can be extended to take peer-dependent and time-varying costs into consideration. The 
value (benefit) of the chunk r  represents the video distortion reduction that the client experiences from 
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receiving a specific chunk. This may also vary depending on its content, the priority class to which it 
belongs to etc. As for the cost, we consider r  to be fixed in our analysis, but extensions to variable 
benefits can be developed within the framework proposed here. We assume that r c>  such that the 
sharing service provided by the P2P network is socially valuable. 
 If a NS= , both the server and client receive a utility of 0.  
Since each peer can maintain multiple simultaneous connections, the utility it receives in one period is 
the sum utility from all the transactions in which it is involved or, in other words, from all of its 
established upload and download connections. The social welfare of the network is quantified by the 
social utility U  that is defined as the average utility of all peers in one period. We assume that peers in 
the network are self-interested and aim to maximize their individual utilities and therefore, they will only 
upload chunks if this has a positive impact on their future utilities (e.g. they can increase their future 
downloads). Since r c> , the social utility is maximized when all servers choose a S=  in their 
transactions. Nevertheless, the myopic equilibrium of the one-stage gift-giving game is a NS= , with 
which a self-interested server who has the incentive to free-ride can maximize its stage-game utility 
myopically, which gives rise to an undesirable utility of 0 for each transaction and hence a zero social 
utility for the entire network.  
C. Social norms 
We adopt a repeated game formulation to model the subsequent interactions among peers and we 
adopt P2P protocols based on social norms in order to improve the inefficiency of the myopic equilibrium. 
Social norms define the rules that the group of peers uses to reward or punish appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviors in the P2P network. Since we focus on protocols that are based on social norms, 
we use the two terms “protocol” and “social norm” interchangeably in the rest of the paper.  
In the repeated game, each peer is tagged with a reputation q  representing its social status. We 
consider the case where reputations take values from a finite set. Thus, without loss of generality, we 
assume that q  is a natural number from the finite set { }  0,1,2, ,L  for some L . For notational 
convenience, a peer of reputation q  is referred to as a q -peer. The high reputation of a peer reflects its 
cooperative behavior in the past, i.e. this peer uploaded content to peers requesting it. The highest 
reputation L  can be gained by a peer which has been cooperative in the past L  periods. The reputation of 
the peers is maintained and updated by a trustworthy third-party device, e.g. the tracker.  
The social norm, denoted by k , is determined by the P2P protocol designer, which is composed of a 
social strategy s  and a reputation scheme t .  
s  is a reputation-based behavioral strategy, which is represented by a mapping  :s ´   , 
where the first   represents the server’s reputation, the second   represents the client’s reputation, and 
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  represents the server’s action. It specifies what action ( ),s q q Î   should a server of reputation 
q Î  select when meeting a client of reputation q Î .  
t  serves as the reward and punishment system in the social norm, and it specifies how a peer’s 
reputation should be updated based on its actions in the transactions that it is engaged. In our framework, 
t  updates a peer’s reputation at the beginning of each period. Specifically, the tracker reviews all upload 
transactions of a peer with the result of the review recorded in a variable { }0,1x Î . At the beginning of a 
period, x  is reset to 0. Then in each transaction, there is a mapping f  which maps the reputations of the 
serving peer and its client as well as the serving peer’s action during one transaction into a binary value as 
{ } : 0,1f ´ ´  . If the action is in accordance to the social strategy, f  outputs 0 indicating that 
the peer behaves well in this transaction; otherwise, if the action is against the social strategy, f  outputs 1 
indicating that the peer does not behave well by not complying with the social norm. After the transaction, 
x  is updated by an OR-operation as :x x f=  . That is, the new value of x  will be 0 if and only if both 
f  and the old value of x  is 0. Hence, after one period, 0x =  if and only if the peer complies with the 
social norm in all of its upload transactions. Once it has deviated in any transaction, we have 1x = . Based 
on the peer’s current reputation and x , t  then determines its new reputation as { } : 0,1t ´  . The 
mapping rule is as follows: if 0x = , t  rewards the good behavior of the peer with an increased 
reputation; on the other hand, if 1x = , t  punishes the peer for not uploading sufficient content in this 
period with a decreased reputation.  
In our framework, a peer’s upload action in one transaction that is used in the mapping of f  is reported 
by its client. We here assume that the client always makes a truthful report 2. However, we do consider the 
impact of network (service) errors. With the probability e  ( 0 1e<  ), a peer which intends to upload a 
chunk in one transaction fails to do so due to a connectivity error.  
To encourage cooperation among peers, we restrict our attention to a set of threshold-based strategies 
G . Every strategy s Î G  can be characterized by a service thresholds ( ) { }1, ,h Ls Î   3, which can be 
specified as follows (We relax this constraint that one strategy only has one service threshold in Section III, 
where difference peers have different service thresholds.) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )          ,
     
S if h and h
NS otherwise
q s q ss q q
ìï ³ ³ïï= íïïïî

 , (1) 
By adopting s , peers with reputation being at least ( )h s , which are called “active peers”, will mutually 
help each other, while peers with reputation lower than ( )h s , referred to as “inactive peers”, cannot 
                                                          
2 The extension to the untruthful report from clients is discussed in Section VI. 
3 Here the strategies with the service threshold being 0  and L+1 are not considered.  
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download chunks from others and do not need to upload chunks to others. To avoid confusion, the 
prescribed social strategy is denoted as os  and the corresponding prescribed service threshold of the social 
strategy is denoted as oh  in order to differentiate these from an ordinary behavioral strategy. 
To encourage compliance with the social strategy which will induce cooperative behaviors among 
peers, the peers are rewarded by an increased reputation. Incompliance (i.e. not complying with the 
prescribed social strategy) is punished by a decreased reputation. To keep the initial design of the P2P 
protocol simple, we consider a reputation scheme t  that provides the harshest punishments to peers when 
they do not comply with the social strategy. (We relax this constraint in Section III, where incompliance 
to the social norm does not necessarily lead to a peer’s reputation falling to 0.) The reputation update rule 
can be written as follows 
 ( ) { }
min , 1         0
,
0                         1
L if x
x
if x
q
t q
ì + =ïï= íï =ïïî
. (2) 
A schematic representation of a social norm is provided in Figure 1, with Figure 1 (a) illustrating the 
decision process of a social strategy, where q  denotes the reputation of the client in one transaction and 
Figure 1 (b) illustrating the decision process of a reputation scheme.  
Here we briefly explain how a peer’s reputation changes after one period under this reputation scheme. 
(1) For an inactive peer of reputation ohq < , it has to comply with the prescribed social strategy os  to 
play a NS=  in all of its upload transactions. Since it does not upload chunks to others, there is no 
error taking place in any of its transactions and hence, its reputation can always be successfully 
increased by 1 after one period by complying with os . 
(2) The social strategy os  prescribes that an active peer of reputation oh Lq£ < should play a S=  
with peers of reputation ohq ³ , i.e. other active peers, and it should play a NS=  with peers of 
reputation ohq < , i.e. inactive peers. Its reputation will be increased by 1 if it complied with os  in 
all the transactions in which it was involved. However, if it failed to upload chunks to an active peer, 
either deliberately or due to a service error, in any transaction, its reputation falls to 0. 
(3) Similarly, if an L -peer complies with os  in all transactions of one period with 0x = , this peer will 
continue to hold reputation L . 
It should be noted that an inactive peer’s reputation is always increased after one period until it reaches 
ohq =  and becomes an active peer. On the contrary, there is always a positive probability of an active 
peer’s reputation not being increased but falling to 0. (We will investigate in a next section what is the 
impact on less harsh punishments.) A peer’s reputation transition probability across periods will be 
explicitly calculated in the next section. 
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The sequence of events in one transaction is summarized in Table 2. 
D. Utilities 
As discussed in the above section, an inactive peer receives a utility of 0 in one period. In this section, 
we determine the utility of an active peer. An active peer’s expected one-period utility depends on the rate 
at which it requests and is requested for chunks. Here we assume that each active peer generates chunk 
requests at a constant rate [14]. In one period, each peer generates a constant request of bl  chunks, where 
l  can be interpreted as the rate at which each connection is utilized per period [13]. Once the download 
request is rejected, the peer immediately redirects this request to another peer on the list provided by the 
tracker until it is matched with a peer who accepts its request. Hence, an active peer can always download 
bl  chunks in one period. Due to the random matching feature of the network, the chunks uploaded by an 
active peer per period is also bl  4. In summary, the expected one-period utility of a peer can be expressed 
as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]1v b r ck q l e= - - , if ohq ³ , (3) 
and  
 ( ) 0vk q = , if ohq < . (4) 
We use the infinite-horizon discounted sum criterion to evaluate a peer’s expected overall utility as the 
sum of its expected one-period utility in the current period and its discounted expected overall utility 
starting from the next period. Let ( )' |pk q q  denote the transition probability of a peer’s reputation across 
periods when following k , which can be determined as follows 
 ( )
{ }'
'
'
'
1 ,    min , 1
,    0
|
,    1
0,  
o
o
o
h and L
h and
p
h and
otherwise
k
a q q q
a q qq q
a q q q
ìï - ³ = +ïïïï ³ =ïï= íï < = +ïïïïïïî
, (5) 
where a  is the probability that an active peer who complies with the social norm is falsely punished due 
to the service error, i.e. its reputation is decreased to 0 rather than being increased. Since a peer’s 
reputation is increased if and only if it complies with the social norm in all upload transactions within one 
period, we have ( )1 1 bla e= - - .  
Therefore, a peer’s expected overall utility in the repeated game starting from any period 0t  when 
following k , can be expressed as 
                                                          
4 The validity of this conclusion also depends on the assumption that chunks are uniformly distributed among peers in the network and each 
chunk has the same popularity. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
'
0
' '|t t t t
t t
v v v p vk k k k k
q
q d q q d q q q
¥¥ ¥
=
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= = +÷ç ÷ç ÷çè øå å , (6) 
where [ )0,1d Î  is a peer-defined discount factor, which represents the weight that a peer gives to its 
utility that can be received in the future. 
The social utility of the network is regarded the average expected one-period utility over all peers and 
hence depends on the reputation distribution of the peer population. The reputation distribution in one 
period is denoted by ( ){ } 0Lqh q = , with each term ( )h q  representing the fraction of peers in the total 
population holding a reputation q . Due to the reputation update in each period, ( ){ }h q  evolves 
dynamically over time. Here we assume that ( ){ }h q  is updated at the beginning of each period and is 
broadcast to all peers in the network. Let tm  denote the fraction of active peers in period t . It is 
equivalent to the fraction of peers whose reputations are above oh , and thus can be expressed as 
( )
s
L
t t
hq
m h q
=
= å . Consequently, the update of ( ){ }h q  across periods can be characterized by the 
following set of equations: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 ,  1 1 
1 ,  1  
0
o
t t t
t t
o
t t
o
t t
L
t t
h
L L L
h L
h
q
h a h a h
h q a h q q
h q h q q
h am
m h q
+
+
+
+
+ +
=
= - + - -
= - - + £ £ -
= - £ £
=
= å
. (7) 
Since we are interested in the long-term utilities of peers, we study the distribution of reputations in the 
long run, which is defined as follows. 
Definition 1 {Stationary distribution}. ( ){ }kh q  is a stationary distribution of reputations under the 
dynamics defined by (7) if it satisfies ( )
0
1
L
k
q
h q
=
=å  and  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1 ,  1 1 
1 ,  1  
0
o
o
o
L
h
L L L
h L
h
k k k
k k
k k
k k
k k
q
h a h a h
h q a h q q
h q h q q
h am
m h q
=
= - + - -
= - - + £ £ -
= - £ £
=
= å
. (8) 
It should be noted that each variable in (8) is subscripted with k  to highlight its dependence on the 
particular social norm. As in [22], we prove the existence of and convergence to a unique stationary 
distribution kh  for a particular social norm k  when all peers comply with its social strategy os . 
Lemma 1. When all peers follow the social strategy os , the reputation distribution of the network 
converges to a unique stationary point ( ){ }kh q  as follow: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1 ,  1 1 
,  0  
1
1
o
o
L h
o
h
o
o
o
L h
h L
h
h
k k k
q
k k
k k
k
h a m a m
h q a am q
h q am q
m a
-
-
= - + + -
= - + £ £ -
= £ £
= +
. (9) 
Proof: See [22]. ■ 
Therefore, the social utility of the network is defined as the expected one-period utility averaged over 
all peers when the reputation distribution is stationary  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1U v b r ck k k k
q
h q q l m e= = - -å . (10) 
III. OPTIMAL DESIGN OF SOCIAL-NORM BASED PROTOCOLS  
A. Defining sustainability in P2P networks  
While designing a protocol, the incentive of peers to follow the prescribed social strategy has to be 
investigated, i.e. we need to investigate whether a social norm is sustainable. Since we consider a non-
cooperative scenario, in order to ensure that a peer has no incentive for deviating unilaterally from the 
social norm, we need to check whether a peer can improve its expected overall utility by deviation. Let 
( )ck q  denote the one-period cost consumed by a server with reputation q  following the social norm k . 
As the first step, we define a social norm to be the social norm equilibrium [17] as follows. 
Definition 2 {Social norm equilibrium}. The social norm ( ),ok s t=  constitutes a social norm 
equilibrium if the sum of its instant utility in one period and its expected future utility thereafter by 
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complying with the social norm k  is larger than the sum of utilities by deviating to any other behavioral 
strategy s  5, i.e. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
' '
' ' ' '
,| | ,c p v c p vk k k s k s
q q
q d q q q q d q q s q¥ ¥- + ³- +å å , for all q  and s Î ,(11) 
where ( )cs q , ( )' | ,p q q s , and ( ),vk s q¥  are a peer’s incurred cost per period,  its reputation transition 
probability from q  to 'q , and its expected overall utility, respectively when it plays s  and the protocol 
designer implements the social norm k  6.  
Hence, if k  is the social norm equilibrium, the peer cannot gain from unilateral deviation regardless of 
the reputation of the client it is matched with when every other peer follows the prescribed social strategy 
os . Thus, under a social norm equilibrium, peers will find it in their own self-interest to comply with the 
social strategy os . 
The definition of social norm equilibrium requires os ’s optimality to be checked using the above 
definition across all possible behavioral strategies under k , thereby incurring a high computational 
complexity. We establish the one-shot deviation principle for social norm equilibrium in [22] to simplify 
the computation, which at the same time serves as a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of 
the social norm equilibrium.  
Lemma 2 (One-shot Deviation Principle). k  is a social norm equilibrium if and only if for any q , 
there is no profitable one-shot deviation, i.e. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
' '
' ' ' '| | ,c c p v p vs k k k k
q q
q q d q q q q q s q¥ ¥é ùê ú- £ -ê úê úë û
å å , for all s Î . (12) 
Proof: See [22]. ■ 
Lemma 2 shows that if a peer cannot gain by unilaterally deviating from the prescribed social strategy 
os  only in the current period while following os  afterwards, it also cannot gain by switching to any other 
strategy s , and vice versa. The left-hand side of (12) can be interpreted as the gain that a peer can obtain 
from the saving on its upload cost in one period by choosing s , while the right-hand side of (12) 
represents the discounted expected future loss which the peer will suffer due to the decrease in reputation 
incurred by choosing s . Using the one-shot deviation principle, we can derive incentive constraints that 
characterize sustainable social norms. There are two cases that need to be considered. 
When an active peer with reputation q  receives upload requests from another active peer with 
                                                          
5 Since the instant downloading benefit of a peer is not affected by the choice of its strategy. It can be subtracted from the formulation of social 
norm equilibrium without affecting the analysis. 
6 It should be noted that starting from a particular transaction, the probability that a peer’s reputation is increased by complying with the social 
norm is always larger than { }( )min , 1 |p Lk q q+ . Hence, the peer will still have sufficient incentive to follow the social norm if (11) holds. 
13 
reputation q , then the protocol requires the q -peer to upload the chunk to the q -peer. Thus, the protocol 
should provide the q -peer incentives to choose a S=  over a NS= . By following the protocol, the q -
peer incurs the upload cost c  in this transaction while its reputation in the next period becomes 
{ }min , 1L q +  with a probability that is at least ( )1 a-  and 0  with a probability that is at most a . 
Meanwhile, it expects to receive M  more upload requests other active peers with 1M bl£ - . Thus, the 
resulting expected overall utility of the q -peer is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )1 1 min , 1 0V S M c v L vq k kd a q a¥ ¥é ù= - + + - + +ë û . On the contrary, if the peer deviates 
by refusing to upload the requested chunk and play a NS= , it saves an instant cost of c  in this 
transaction as well as in all the future transactions within this period 7, but at the expense that its 
reputation falls to 0  with probability 1, starting from the next period 8. The expected overall utility is thus 
( ) ( )0V NS vq kd ¥= . As the one-shot deviation principle (12) specifies, the peer has no incentive to 
deliberately refuse to upload if ( ) ( )V S V NSq q³ , which can be transformed into the following inequality 
by taking 1M bl= -  9 
 ( ) { }( ) ( )1 min , 1 0v L v bck kd a q l¥ ¥é ù- + - ³ë û . (13) 
In the second case when ohq < , q -peers should refuse to upload by complying with the social norm. 
Thus, the social norm should provide q -peers incentives to choose a NS=  over a S= . Similar to (13), 
the resulting inequality for the peer to have no incentive to upload deliberately is 
 ( ) { }( ) ( )1 min , 1 0v L v ck kd a q¥ ¥é ù- + - ³-ë û . (14) 
B. Design problem of optimal sustainable social norms 
Based on the above discussion, a protocol can be designed by selecting three parameters: the 
punishment length L , the service threshold oh , and the maximal number of concurrent connections b . 
We assume that the protocol designer aims to choose a protocol that maximizes the social utility (i.e. 
sharing level among peers) among the candidate protocols that can be sustained as social norm equilibria, 
then the problem of designing the optimal protocol in this paper can be formalized as follows (we call this 
problem “optimal social norm equilibrium - OSNE”) 
                                                          
7 If an active peer deviates, it will be punished with probability 1. Hence, it has no incentive to comply with the protocol in the subsequent 
transactions within this period, since its reputation cannot be increased. 
8 It does not affect the analysis when the reputation does not fall to 0 as in a general reputation mechanism, though peers will have a different 
form of incentive. 
9 If the following inequality holds, ( ) ( )V S V NSq q³  also holds for a general 1M bl£ - . 
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 (OSNE) 
We have proved in [22] that the optimal social utility that can be achieved for a social norm 
equilibrium always monotonically increases with L . Therefore, in the following discussion, we consider 
the design problem of ( ),oh b  given a value of L  which can be selected based on the desired complexity 
of the protocol.  
C. Designing and characterizing the optimal social norm equilibrium 
In this section, we explicitly analyze how the design parameters ( ),oh b  will impact the social utility as 
well as the peers’ incentives to comply with the prescribed protocol. This analysis enables us to 
characterize the optimal design, denoted as ( )* *,oh b , which maximizes the social utility while providing 
peers sufficient incentive to comply with the protocol.  
First, we analyze the relationship between the social utility Uk  and ( ),oh b . We can verify from 
Problem (OSNE) that Uk  monotonically increases with b . On the other hand, since 
1
1 oh
km a= +  
monotonically decreases with oh , we can also conclude that Uk  monotonically decreases with oh . 
Therefore, when we design protocols in a network where peers comply with the protocol, it is always 
optimal to select 1oh =  and the largest b  that is allowed by the system constraints (e.g. the device 
constraints of peers). Hence, the design problem now becomes selecting the smallest oh  and the largest b  
for which the incentive constraints in Problem (OSNE) are satisfied. 
We then discuss the influence of ( ),oh b  on peers’ incentives. In particular, we provide the following 
proposition to establish what conditions should ( ),oh b  fulfil (i.e. how should these parameters be selected 
by the protocol designer) in order to sustain the resulting protocol as a social norm equilibrium. 
Proposition 1. A protocol ( ),ok s t=  can be sustained as a social norm equilibrium if and only if   
(1) its service threshold oh  is larger than a constant oH  that is defined as 
 ( )( ) ( )[ ]
1
ln 1 / ln
1 1o o
c
h H
r c c
d da e da
é ù-ê ú³ -ê ú- - - -ë û
 ; (16) 
 (2) the maximum number of concurrent connections b  is smaller than a constant B , which is the 
solution of the following equation set 
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. (17) 
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ 
Proposition 1 provides a guideline for selecting the parameters ( ),oh b  of a P2P reciprocation protocol 
which can be sustained as a social norm equilibrium. As the proof shows, increasing the service threshold 
oh  enlarges the gap between the overall utility that can be received by active and inactive peers. Hence, 
larger values of oh  provide a larger threat of future punishment and thus, provide peers increased 
incentives to comply with the prescribed protocol. On the other hand, increasing the value of b  raises the 
one-period utility of an active peer and hence enlarges { }( ) ( )min , 1 0v L vk kq¥ ¥+ - . However, larger b  
also leads to the increase of a , since more transactions in one period raises the chance for a peer to make 
a mistake and thus being punished. The computation in Appendix A shows that a  has a more significant 
impact on peers’ incentives than { }( ) ( )min , 1 0v L vk kq¥ ¥+ -  does, and hence, an increasing b  reduces 
the peers’ incentives to comply in general. In Section V, we show the trade-off between an increased 
social efficiency and a decreased incentive to comply with the prescribed protocol by adjusting oh  and b . 
As mentioned above, there are always practical constraints that need to be taken into consideration 
when we design the protocol. Here, we consider two specific constraints as 1 oh L£ £  and 0b > . 
Failure to find a ( ),oh b  within this required region means that there exists no protocol which peers will 
follow out  of their self-interests (i.e. only non-cooperative behaviors can be sustained as a social norm-
equilibrium) and thus, the network will collapse in such network settings. In the following proposition, 
we establish sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of social norm equilibrium.  
Proposition 2. (1) There exist protocols that can be sustained as social norm equilibria if and only if 
 
( )21 1
1 1
L
c L
c
T
r
d e d
d d d
é ù- -ê úë û£ é ù- + -ê úë û
 ; (18) 
(2) There exist protocols that can be sustained as social norm equilibria if and only if a peer’s discount 
factor d  is larger than or equal to a certain threshold Td , which can be determined as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1
1
1 1
1 1
L
L
r c
T T c
T Td d d d
ee e e +
- -é ù- - =ê úë û - - - . (19) 
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ 
Proposition 2 shows that a non-trivial (cooperative) social norm equilibrium exists if and only if the 
service cost to benefit ratio is sufficiently small or peers are sufficiently patient. In both cases, peers will 
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put sufficient weight on the future reward which they will obtain from downloads rather than on saving 
the instant upload cost. Therefore, Proposition 2 can be used as a guideline for designing the optimal 
social norm by the protocol designer based on its evaluation of the network conditions and peers’ 
characteristics. If / cc r T>  or Tdd < , the network will collapse (i.e. no social norm equilibrium can be 
sustained in this network). Hence, the P2P system should be redesigned to either decrease the service cost 
per transaction or increase the peers’ patience (the applications need to adopt a larger discount factor). 
Based on Proposition 1 and 2, we are able to design the algorithm to determine the optimal values of 
( ),oh b , denoted as ( )* *,oh b . The procedure for determining the optimal protocol design algorithm is 
summarized in Table 3. 
D. Reputation schemes with less harsh punishments  
So far we have focused on reputation schemes under which any deviation from the prescribed protocol 
is punished with the harshest punishment, i.e. their reputation is reduced to the minimum. Although this 
class of reputation schemes is simple because the protocol designer needs only to consider one parameter, 
the number of reputations L , such protocols may not yield the highest social utility among all possible 
reputation schemes when there are service errors. In this section, we discuss less harsh punishments by 
assuming that, upon deviation, each peer’s reputation falls to 0 with a probability less than 1. Particularly, 
we introduce a probability 1b £ . When a q -peer deviates from the protocol in one period, its reputation 
falls to 0 with a probability 11 L qb - +- , and remains unchanged with probability 1L qb - + . Therefore, the 
higher reputation a peer has, the larger will its probability to be forgiven upon deviation be. This class of 
reputation schemes can be identified by two design parameters ( , )L b . (The reputation scheme discussed 
in Section III can be considered as a special case where 0b = .) b  affects the evolution of the reputation 
distribution, and the stationary distribution of reputations with the reputation scheme ( , )L b  satisfies the 
following set of equations: 
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. (20) 
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Let the social utility now denoted as ,LU b , which is still as defined in (10). The protocol designer’s 
problem becomes the following (we call this problem “optimal social norm equilibrium with variable 
punishment – OSNE/VP”) 
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 (OSNE/VP) 
Besides the design of parameters ( ), ,oL h b , the protocol designer also has to consider the selection of 
parameterb  in order to maximize the social utility without violating the incentive constraints. Next, we 
investigate how b  impacts the social utility and peers’ incentives. First, it can be determined from (10) 
that ,LU b  monotonically increases with ,L bm . That is, the social utility increases as the fraction of peers 
who can receive upload services increases according to the protocol. As ,L bm  monotonically increases 
with b , we have the following conclusion. 
Proposition 3. The social utility ,LU b  monotonically increases withb .  
Proof: See Appendix B. 
According to Proposition 3, the protocol designer prefers to select b  as large as possible in order to 
maximize the efficiency of the network. However, similarly to Problem (OSNE), such a selection is 
restricted by the incentive constraints for peers to comply with the resulting protocol.  
Next, we study b ’s impact on peers’ incentives. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and 2, we show 
that peers’ incentive to follow a particular social strategy monotonically decreases with b . 
Proposition 4. There is a threshold sb  for each social strategy s  such that s  can be sustained in a 
social norm equilibrium if and only if sb b£  
Proof: See Appendix B. ■ 
We can thus conclude from Proposition 4 that a larger probability b  to remain at the current 
reputation for a peer reduces the threat of future punishment, which in turn decreases a peer’s incentive to 
comply with the protocol.  
Based on Proposition 3 and 4, it can be concluded that there exist a trade-off between an increased 
social efficiency and an decreased incentive to comply with the prescribed protocol by adjusting b . The 
optimal b  can be determined using similar algorithms as in Table 3. 
E. Social strategy with various service thresholds 
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The current social strategy adopted has a uniform service threshold oh  for all active peers. In this 
section, we discuss how the performance of a protocol changes when active peers of different reputations 
have different service thresholds. Particularly, we consider strategies 1s Î G  that can be characterized by a 
set of service thresholds ( ) { }1, ,h Ls Î   and ( ){ } ( )L hm ms s q sq ==   10 , which can be specified as 
follows  
 ( ) ( ) ( )          ,
     
S if h and m
NS otherwise
sq s q qs q q
ìï ³ ³ïï= íïïïî

 , (22) 
and 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1m h m h m Ls s ss s£ + £ £  for any ( )hq s³ . (23) 
Hence by adopting s , an active peer of reputation ( )hq s³  will help peers of reputation ( )msq q³ . 
Similar to Section II, we denote the prescribed service thresholds of the social strategy are denoted as oh  
and ( ){ }
o
L
o o h
m m qq == . 
Now each peer does not provide homogeneous services to others within one period. It can be specified 
from (23) that active peers with lower reputation provide more services than active peers with higher 
reputation. Hence, the amount of chunks uploaded by an active peer depends on its reputation q , the set 
of service thresholds om , the reputation distribution h , as well as l  and b . Correspondingly, the 
average service cost consumed by an active peer in one period can be denoted as ( ), , , ,oq b mk l q h  and its 
expected one period utility being denoted as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 , , , ,o ov b rI m h q b mk kq l e q l q h= - £ - . (24) 
The indication function ( )( )oI m h q£  takes the value of 1 if ( )om h q£ , i.e. there exist peers in the 
network who would help q -peers according to the prescribed protocol; and it takes the value of 0 if 
( )om h q> , i.e. there exists no peer who would provide services to q -peers. The social utility is still 
defined as the average utility of all peers when the reputation distribution is stationary as follows 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 , , , ,
o
o o
h
U v b rI m h q b mk k k k k
q q
h q q h q l e q l q h
³
é ù= = - £ -ë ûå å . (25) 
Hence, the optimal design problem (OSNE/VP) can be rewritten as follows (we call this problem 
“optimal social norm equilibrium with variable punishment and service threshold – OSNE/VPS”) 
                                                          
10 Here the strategies with the service threshold being 0  and 1L +  are not considered.  
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(OSNE/VPS) 
In the following proposition, we characterize how om  impact the social utility and peers’ incentives. 
In particular, we can prove that (1) the solution for om  which maximizes the social utility (25) preserves 
the property as: ( ) ( ) ( )1o o o o oh m h m h m Ls= £ + £ £  for any ohq ³ ; (2) the solution for om  
which maximizes peers’ incentives to follow the resulting protocol is the one specified as: ( )o o om h h=  
and ( ) 1o om hq = +  for any 1ohq ³ + . 
Proposition 5. (1) The service thresholds om  which satisfies ( )o o om h h=  maximizes the social 
utility (25) among all possible ms  for 1s Î G . 
(2) the set of service thresholds om  that is defined as follows 
 ( ) 1o om hq = +  for any ohq ³  (27) 
maximizes peers’ incentives. That is, if there exists a set of service thresholds 'om  that satisfies the 
incentive constraints in Problem (OSNE/VPS), then om  also satisfies these incentive constraints. 
Proof: The proof can be conducted from Proposition 1 and 2, which is omitted due to space limitation. 
■ 
From Proposition 5, we could determine that the optimal solution of Problem (OSNE/VPS) should 
always set ( ) 1o om hq £ +  for any 1ohq ³ + . However, similar to b , there also exists a trade-off 
between an increased social efficiency and an decreased incentive to comply with the prescribed protocol 
by adjusting ( )o om h  between oh  and 1oh + .  
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGNS FOR NETWORKS WITH ALTRUISTIC AND FREE-RIDING 
PEERS 
The analysis in this paper so far assumes that all peers in the network are self-interested and strategic, 
i.e. they select their actions in order to maximize their long-term utilities. We refer to these peers as 
“reciprocative” since they will provide services if recipients of the services are likely to return the favour 
[23]. Nevertheless, in practical P2P networks, there are also other types of peers who may not be strategic 
and will play the same action constantly. For example in P2P multimedia sharing applications, the 
protocol designer may usually be able to deploy some peers in the network, e.g. seeds, that have the entire 
media file, which are called altruistic peers. Altruistic peers provide upload services in response to any 
request it receives, regardless of the peer’s reputation where the request comes from.  Meanwhile, they do 
20 
not send any chunk requests to others. However, due to the bandwidth limitation, the number of upload 
services that can be provided by an altruistic peer in one period is limited. For the purpose of illustration, 
we assume that an altruistic peer can provide a maximum number of bl  services per period 11. Hence, an 
altruistic peer always plays 1a =  in any upload transaction in which it is engaged. In this way, the 
protocol designer tries to increase the sharing efficiency in the network by adjusting the fraction of 
altruistic peers in the peer population, denoted by Cp . Since altruistic peers are deployed by the protocol 
designer, we assume that they can be identified by the system. That is, an altruistic peer will be assigned a 
reputation L  by the protocol constantly, regardless of whether its upload is successful or not. 
On the contrary, there are also malicious peers, whose goal is to cause damages to other peers and 
attack the system. The most common attacks include incomplete chunk attack and pollution attack [24]. 
In an incomplete chunk attack, a malicious peer agrees to send the entire requested chunk to its client, but 
sends only portions of it or no data at all. In a pollution attack, a malicious peer corrupts the media chunks, 
renders the content unreadable, and then makes this polluted content available for sharing with other peers. 
In both cases, the client of a malicious peer wastes its download connection and has to request the same 
chunk again in a separate transaction. Meanwhile, a malicious peer is regarded to be playing 0a =  in any 
upload transaction it is engaged. The fraction of malicious peers in the population is denoted as Dp . Here 
we assume that malicious peers are treated by the protocol as regular reciprocative peers, whose 
reputation will increase after complying with the protocol and decrease after deviating from the protocol. 
In this section, we analyze the impact of such altruistic and free-riding population on the design of P2P 
protocols. The fraction of reciprocative peers is correspondingly denoted as 1R C Dp p p= - - . First, we 
analyze the impact of malicious peers by assuming 0Cp = , i.e. 1R Dp p= -  12 .  To simplify the 
analysis, we consider the reputation scheme with 0b =  and the social strategy with ( )o om hq =  for all 
ohq ³ , but a similar analysis can be performed for other schemes and social stategies. Similar to the 
previous sections, we are also interested in the long run stationary distribution of reputation, denoted as 
( ){ } 0LD qh q = , with Dm  denoting the fraction of peers that can receive services according to the protocol. 
Since a malicious peer does not provide any complete or uncorrupted chunks to other peers, its reputation 
will follow the iterative process of being increased by 1 per period first until reaching oh , and then falling 
to 0 . Let ( ){ } 0LD qw q =  denote the stationary distribution of the malicious peer population, which can be 
expressed as follows: 
                                                          
11 The results in this section do not change when the maximum number of services is not bl . 
12 The impacts of malicious peer and altruistic peer are additive. Hence, the results in this section can be applied to networks where malicious 
peers and altruistic peers co-exist. 
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Meanwhile, let ( ){ } 0LR qw q =  denote the stationary distribution of reciprocative peers, and it can be 
computed using (8). Summing up, the stationary reputation distribution of the population can be solved 
using the following set of equations: 
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Since malicious peers consume a reciprocative peer’s download rate, the reciprocative peer tries to 
download 
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 chunks from other reciprocative peers. Therefore, an active reciprocative peer’s 
expected one-period utility now can be formalized as  
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which monotonically decreases with Dp  
13. 
From (30), we can thus determine that the average number of chunks reciprocative peers can receive 
monotonically decreases with Dp  and so is their average one-period utility. The stationary distribution 
(29) and the expected one-period utility (30) also enable us to analyze the reciprocative peers’ incentives 
to comply with the protocol using one-shot deviation principle. The result is formalized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 6. Given a protocol ( ),ok s t=  and the fraction of malicious peers Dp , peers’ incentive 
to comply with k  monotonically decrease with Dp . 
Proof: See Appendix C. ■ 
                                                          
13 Here we assume that a reciprocative peer knows the value of Dp  by measuring how many incomplete or polluted chunks it receives in the 
past. 
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Proposition 6 indicates that the presence of malicious peers does not only decrease the social welfare, 
but also their incentives to comply with the protocol.  
Next, we investigate how altruistic peers impact the reciprocative peers’ utilities and incentives with 
0Dp =  and 1R Cp p= - . Similarly, we let ( ){ } 0LC qh q =  denote the corresponding stationary 
distribution and Cm  denote the fraction of peers that can receive services according to the protocol.  
Since an altruistic peer is assigned a constant reputation of L  by the system, ( ){ } 0LC qh q =  can be 
computed as 
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Here, as altruistic peers do not download chunks from other peers, the average upload cost of an active 
reciprocative peer can be calculated as 
( )C C
C
b p
c
l m
m
-
 as some of its upload tasks are shared by altruistic 
peers. Hence, an active reciprocative peer’s expected one period utility now becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 C C
C
b p
v b r ck
l mq l e m
-= - - , for ohq ³ . (32) 
An inactive reciprocative peer can also receive services from an altruistic peer. Hence, its expected 
one-period utility now becomes 
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It is easy to specify from (32) and (33) that altruistic peers reduce the upload cost of active peers while 
raising the download benefit of inactive peers. Hence, the average utility of reciprocative peers 
monotonically increases with Cp . Also, by incorporating (31) - (33) into the one-shot deviation principle, 
we show that Cp  cannot be too large in order to sustain a reciprocative peer’s incentive to comply with 
the protocol.  
Proposition 7. Given a protocol ( ),ok s t=  and the fraction of altruistic peers Cp , k  can be 
sustained as a social norm equilibrium if and only if Cp  is below certain threshold 0.5Cp £ . 
Proof: See Appendix C. ■ 
23 
Proposition 7 provides a counter-intuitive result as it is not always good to increase Cp   in the network. 
Although having more altruistic peers allows more upload services in the network, they in turn harm a 
peer’s incentive to comply with the protocol, which reduces the cooperative sharing behavior among 
reciprocative peers.  
Figure 2 plots the average utility of reciprocative peers in the network against Dp  and Cp . It shows 
that the utility monotonically decreases with Dp  . When Dp  reaches certain points, peers lose their 
incentive to follow the protocol and the network collapses with the average utility falling to 0. Meanwhile, 
the utility does not monotonically increases with Cp , since reciprocative peers lose the incentive to 
comply with the protocol at certain point of Cp . However, as Cp  approaches 1, the average utility finally 
reaches the optimal value ( )1b rl e-  since all peers’ download requests can be fully served by altruistic 
peers. 
Although the average utility of reciprocative peers reaches the optimum when Cp  approaches 1, the 
protocol designer cannot choose a Cp  that is arbitrarily large due to the fact that the sharing behavior of 
altruistic peers also incurs upload costs. As an altruistic peer has all the chunks, it cannot gain any benefit 
by receiving chunks from other peers, we thus regard an altruistic peer’s utility in one transaction as its 
upload cost. Figure 3 plots the social utility of all peers in the network, including altruistic peers and 
reciprocative peers, against Cp . This figure shows that the social utility does not increase monotonically 
with Cp . Therefore, the protocol designer should select the optimal value of Cp  as the point that 
maximizes the social utility of all peers – an optimization which is formalized as follows (we call this 
problem “optimal social norm equilibrium with altruistic peers – OSNE/AH”): 
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{ }( )
{ }( )
, , ,
maximize   
subject to  (1 ) min 1, (0) ,  
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k k
d a q l q
d a q q
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, (OSNE/AH) 
where  
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(35) 
The problem (OSNE/AH) can be solved using a similar iterative algorithm as the one in Table 3.  
Figure 4 plots the optimal social utility and the corresponding optimal fraction of altruistic peers as *Cp  by 
solving (OSNE/AH).  
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V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
A. Simulation settings 
In this section, we illustrate the impact of the proposed social norm based protocols on P2P 
multimedia sharing networks using the simulator built up by Matlab. A number of 200 peers are deployed 
in the network. All peers have the same download rate of 1Mbps. In each experiment, peers exchange a 
single video file of approximate size 100 Mbits, at CIF (352´528) resolution and 30 frames per second. 
The video is encoded using H.264/AVC codec and divided into chunks of 0.1s. All peers join the network 
at the same time. In the experiments, we deploy a reputation set { }  0,1,2, 3 , i.e.  3L = , 0b =  and 
( )o om hq =  for all ohq ³ .  We keep   and L  fixed during the experiments. 
B. Performance evaluation 
(1) The impact of network conditions 
The performance of a protocol is not only affected by the design parameters ( ), ,oL h b , but also by the 
parameters ( ), ,r c e , which are intrinsic to the network conditions, as well as ( ),l d , which are selected by 
peers. In this and the following sections, we discuss how the performances of social norm based protocols 
are influenced by these intrinsic parameters. We first assess the impact of the network conditions. 
From the analysis in Section III, it can be observed that the impact of r  and c  on peers’ incentives is 
reflected through the service cost to benefit ratio /c r . Figure 5 plots the social utility of protocols with 
1,2, 3oh = , respectively, by varying /c r  and e  from 0 to 1. b  is optimized based on Problem (OSNE). 
This figure highlights that the social utility decreases monotonically as the network conditions become 
worse, since larger /c r  and e  reduce the threat of punishment provided by the protocol. This figure also 
illustrates the trade-off between social utility and incentives for peers to comply with the protocol. Taking 
the maximum of the social utilities corresponding to 1,2, 3oh =  at each point of /c r  and e , the optimal 
social utility is also plotted in the figures as the green curves, with the corresponding oh  at each point 
being the optimal service threshold *oh  that solves Problem (OSNE). Although protocols with low oh  
provide higher social utility when the network conditions are good with small /c r  and e , protocols with 
high oh  provides larger incentives for peers and thus have better performance when the network 
conditions worse off. Therefore, *oh  monotonically increases with both /c r  and e . When / 0.9c r >  or 
0.95e > , there exists no protocol that can be sustained as social norm equilibrium and the social utility 
falls to 0. 
(2) The impact of peer characteristics 
We then discuss how the peer characteristics impact the protocols’ performance. The results are shown 
in Figure 6. 
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With d  increasing, a peer gives higher weight on its overall utility instead of its instant utility. As 
Proposition 2 shows, the social norm will be more effective in incentivizing peers to cooperate in such 
cases. It should also be noted that the protocol with high oh  has a better performance when d  is small, 
even though the punishment prohibits the sharing activity between peers. When d  is between 0.2  and 
0.3 , L -peers with 2oh =  and 3  already have incentives to comply with the protocol, and will mutually 
cooperate with each other; while L -peers with 1oh =  are still disincentivized and will not cooperate. 
Therefore, *oh  monotonically decreases with d . 
As l  represents the rate that each connection is utilized per period, the social utility in general 
increases with l , since higher frequency of chunk exchange between peers makes the network more 
socially valuable. However, as a peer engages in more transactions per period, the probability a  that it 
will be falsely punished by the protocol also increases. Hence, a larger l  reduces peers’ incentives, 
which are reflected at points when the social utility falls instantly. Therefore, when l  is small, it is 
beneficial to select a large b  to increase the chunk exchange frequency. On the other hand, when l  is 
large and the network is congested, selecting a small b  is better so as to reduce the error probability. 
Determined from the optimal social utility plotted as the green curve, the optimal *b  decreases with l . 
(3) Video Quality Comparison  
In this section, we explicitly compare the average PSNR of the decoded video among all peers using 
different protocols. The exchanged video content is the well-known “Foreman” sequence repeated 
multiple times to create a long sequence. Besides the protocols studied in this paper, the performance of 
the Tit-for-Tat (TFT) protocol is also analyzed. To make the TFT applicable to networks with random 
matching features, we slight change the protocol, which is defined as follows. 
 The reputation set is binary as { } 0,1= . 
 The social strategy TFTs  is defined as: ( ),TFT Ss q q =  if 1q = ; ( ),TFT NSs q q =  if 0q = . 
 Using the same rule to calculate the statistic x  as in Section II, ( ) , 0,  xt q q= " Î . The reputation 
scheme is defined as: ( ), 0 1xt q = =  and ( ), 1 0xt q = = . 
Table 4 presents the results given the parameters 5b = , 1l = , and 0.8d =  for all peers. We also 
deploy 10% of altruistic peers in the network as seeds, i.e. 0.1Cp = . Meanwhile, we also consider 
variable combinations of ( )/ ,c r e . There are four strategies being considered: the threshold-based 
strategy with 1,2, 3oh =  respectively, and TFT. For the threshold-based strategy, we choose the optimal 
values of b  and om  to maximize Problem (OSNE/VPS). When the service cost to benefit ratio and the 
service error are low, TFT delivers a PSNR which is comparable to those of threshold-based strategies. 
Meanwhile, as TFT only has two reputation levels and less peers being falsely punished, its PSNR is 
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higher than those of threshold-based strategies with 2, 3oh = . On the other hand, our social norm based 
protocols are more robust by using threshold-based strategies, which deliver performances that are more 
insensitive to the variation on network conditions.  
Figure 7 illustrates the advantage of optimal social norm equilibrium over fixed protocols which are 
selected in ad-hoc by explicitly comparing the performances of the following protocols 
 Protocol 1: all peers cooperate unconditionally without considering the incentive constraints. 
 Protocol 2: optimal social norm equilibrium with oh , b , b , and Cp  being optimized. 
 Protocol 3: a fixed social norm with 3oh = , 5b = , 0b = , and 0.3Cp = . 
 Protocol 4: TFT with 5b = , 0b =  and 0.3Cp = . 
Since all peers provide full services in Protocol 1, the performance it delivers remains to be constant 
and serves as the Pareto boundary of the performance that an incentive protocol can possibly achieve. 
Using this as a benchmark, Figure 7 shows that the optimal social norm equilibrium leads to significant 
improvements in terms of PSNR over Protocol 3 and 4, both of which adopt fixed strategies. As the PSNR 
delivered by the optimal social norm equilibrium remains roughly constant against the variation of /c r , 
the PSNR delivered by Protocol 3 and 4 drastically decrease with /c r . When /c r  exceeds 0.25, the 
network adopting TFT collapses; while such collapse also happens in the network adopting Protocol 3 
when /c r  exceeds 0.45. In both cases, the reciprocative peers lose their incentive to follow the protocols 
and do not mutually provide upload services at all. Hence, there only exist minimum upload services in the 
network which are provided by the altruistic peers. 
VI. POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this section we discuss possible extensions to our proposed framework to accommodate some other 
unique features of P2P multimedia sharing applications.  
A. Scalable video delivery 
Our proposed framework in Section II assumes that all the chunks are of equal size and they have the 
same benefit (value) in terms of the multimedia distortion reduction. This framework can be improved by 
explicitly considering the priorities of the various chunks. The set of priority classes may depend on the 
specific video encoder used by the content creator. Using standard-based video codecs (e.g. H.264/AVC 
or MPEG-2) as the example, video files are typically compressed into three classes of frames (Intra (I), 
Predictive (P), and Bi-directionally predictive (B)). In addition, each frame can be classified by its activity 
level taking values from the set {High, Medium, Low} in order to capture the variations in activity level 
(e.g. motion) between scenes [19]. Assuming that chunks are partitioned into J  classes under this priority 
classification model, each chunk from class { }1,2, ,j JÎ   has a class-dependent value jr  and a size jd . 
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For example, a chunk containing high-motion content and/or I-frames should have a higher value and a 
larger size than a chunk containing low-motion content and/or B-frames. Moreover, the upload cost and 
the service error per transaction also vary according to the size of the chunk, denoted as ( )jc d  and ( )jde , 
respectively. In general, we should have that ( ) ( )'j jc d c d>  and  ( ) ( )'j jd de e>  for any 'j jd d> , 
implying that a chunk with larger size should incur a higher upload cost to the server and a higher 
probability to be lost during transmission.  
As the chunks that a peer uploads in different transactions are no longer homogeneous, the calculation 
of a peer’s contribution in one period should put different weights on transactions depending on the 
properties of chunks uploaded in order to differentiate among the priority classes. In particular, the 
contribution, denoted as y , is measured as the total value of chunks that a peer uploads in one period, that 
is, 
1
b
i i
i
y r x
l
=
= å , where ir  denotes the chunk value and { }0,1ix Î  denotes the output of each transaction 
respectively for the peer’s i -th upload transaction in one period. Due to the fact that ir  takes a finite 
number of values, y  also takes values from a finite set, denoted as Y . Hence, t  determines the peer’s 
new reputation as  : Yt ´  . In this way, the reputation scheme updates the reputation depending 
not only on whether a peer contributes or not, but also on how much a peer contributes. Therefore, the 
incentives for peers to cooperate and contribute can be further stimulated, which can significantly 
increase the efficiency of the protocol. Since both   and Y  are finite, the reputation scheme can be 
represented as a lookup table in practical implementations. An illustrative example of such lookup table is 
presented in Table 5 by setting 5L = , 0.5l = , 2b = , 3J = , and { }5,10,20jr Î , where each entry 
represents the new reputation after the update. 
Moreover, the priority classification of media chunks also affects a peer’s incentive to comply with the 
protocol, as different ( )jc d  and ( )jde  according to different chunk sizes impact a peer’s evaluation on 
its instant utility and thus influence the strength of threat from future punishments that are imposed by the 
protocol. Specifically, as a larger chunk incurs higher upload cost in the current transaction as well as a 
higher probability of service error which in turn reduces its expected future utility, the protocol might be 
unable to provide sufficient incentives for a peer who is willing to upload a short chunk to comply with. 
In order to design a robust protocol in this case, one solution would be to select sufficiently large oh  and 
sufficiently small b  such that the protocol can still provide incentives for peers to comply with for the 
smallest value in ( ){ }
1
J
j j
c d =  and the largest value of ( ){ } 1Jj jde = . However, such design might not be 
efficient since large oh  and small b  will introduce strong punishment in the network and thus reduce the 
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social utility. Therefore by adjusting oh  and b , we could also propose an alternative approach to design a 
protocol which might not be in equilibrium for all possible chunk types, but only ensures peers’ 
incentives to upload chunks types which are most important to the video quality (e.g. chunks containing I-
frames). With a lower level of punishment than in the previous approach, the social utility of the network 
can be possibly raised. 
B. Whitewashing  
In our proposed framework, we do not consider the population dynamics in P2P networks where peers 
leave and join the network dynamically. If peers newly joining the network are treated undiscriminatively 
by assigning them the same reputation, an existing peer in the network with a low reputation might 
deliberately leave and rejoin the network in order to acquire a new identity and a higher reputation. This 
is commonly known as the whitewashing effect [14]. To address this problem, a straightforward approach 
is to assign each peer in the network a fixed identity (e.g. a username) which cannot change over time. 
However, this incurs a high implementation cost which hinders the scalability of the P2P system. 
Meanwhile, a peer can still take advantage by registering multiple identities. Under our framework, the 
whitewashing effect can be effectively mitigated by adjusting the initial reputation that is assigned to 
newly joined peers. Since a peer’s incentive to whitewash depends on its comparison between the instant 
cost it expenses on leaving and rejoining the network and the increase on future utility it can gain with a 
better new reputation, we could set the initial reputation to the highest value that is just enough to provide 
the peer an increase on future utility that is smaller than its whitewashing cost.  
C. False reporting 
We assume clients report truthfully to the tracker about the services received from servers. However, 
peers will have incentives to lie in their reports if this brings them positive effects on their long-term 
utilities by either raising their own reputations or reducing the reputations of their opponents. The reason 
why false reporting can potentially subvert our social norm based protocols is that a peer’s reputation puts 
equal weights on the opinion of everyone in the system, which is called “objective reputation”. To 
address this problem, a peer can compute the reputations of its opponents subjectively by incorporating its 
own opinions based on its own interactions with specific peers, which is called “subjective reputation”. 
The peer can then combine the subjective reputation and the objective reputations to evaluate a particular 
peer. Depending on how much the peer trusts this opponent (e.g. the interaction frequency between them, 
the topological connections, etc.), the peer can dynamically adjust the weights it puts to the subjective and 
objective reputations, respectively. Under this approach, the reliability of our reputation scheme increases 
as peers in general put larger weights on the subjective reputation when they meet an opponent with 
which they had frequent interactions with and thus they are familiar with, while they put larger weights on 
the objective reputation when they meet a stranger.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we build on our theoretical framework in [22] to analyze and design the incentive 
protocols based on indirect reciprocity for P2P multimedia sharing applications. We designed optimal 
social norms which are sustainable and thus, under which no peer gains by deviating from the prescribed 
social strategy and thus have no incentive to deviate deliberately. We investigated the design of optimal 
incentive protocols in order to maximize the sharing efficiency of the network. We analyzed the structures 
of optimal incentive protocols, identifying the trade-off between efficiency and incentives, and proposed a 
simple protocol design algorithm. We also discussed the impact of variable punishment, variable service 
thresholds, as well as altruistic and malicious populations, on the design and performance of optimal 
incentive protocols. Our simulation results illustrate the impacts of the network conditions and peer 
characteristics on the performance of incentive protocols and verify that our social norm based protocol 
can deliver better performance than traditional incentive protocols. Lastly, as the future research, we 
discussed possible extensions on our proposed framework which consider other unique features of P2P 
multimedia sharing applications.  
APPENDIX A 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
From (5) and (6), the expected overall utilities can be represented recursively as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )1 min , 1 0v v v L vk k k kq q d a q a¥ ¥ ¥é ù= + - + +ë û , for ohq ³ ; (37) 
and  
 ( ) { }( )min , 1v v Lk kq d q¥ ¥= + , for ohq < . (38) 
Substituting (3) into (37) and (38), it is easy to specify that ( )vk q¥  is non-decreasing with q , i.e. 
( ) ( )1 2v vk kq q¥ ¥³  when 1 2q q> .  
From (37), it can be derived that for any ohq ³ , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) { }( ) { }( )1 1 min , 2 min , 1v v v L v Lk k k kq q d a q q¥ ¥ ¥ ¥é ù+ - = - + - +ë û . (39) 
Particularly, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 1 2 1v v v vk k k kq q d a q q¥ ¥ ¥ ¥+ - = - + - + , for 1sh Lq£ £ - , (40) 
 and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 1 0v L v L v L v Lk k k kd a¥ ¥ ¥ ¥- - = - - = . (41) 
Therefore, we have the conclusion that ( ) ( )ov v hk kq¥ ¥=  for all ohq > . Substituting this into (37), 
we have that  
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 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 oho o ov h b r c v h v hk k kl e d a ad¥ ¥ ¥é ù= - - + - +ê úë û . (42) 
Hence, ( )ov hk¥  is solved as  
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1
1
1 1 oo h
b r c
v hk
l e
d a ad
¥
+
- -= - - - . (43) 
Due to the monotonicity of ( )vk q¥ , only two incentive constraints from Problem (OSNE) need to be 
checked in order to determine a protocol’s equilibrium property. For reputations smaller than oh , it has to 
be verified that  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )11 1 0 1 o oh h ov v v h ck k kd a d a d d¥ ¥ - ¥- - = - - ³- , (44) 
and for reputations larger than or equal to oh , it has to be verified that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 0 1 1 oho ov h v v h bck k kd a d a d l¥ ¥ ¥é ù- + - = - - ³ë û . (45) 
Once (44) and (45) are satisfied at the same time, we can thus conclude that the protocol k  is a social 
norm equilibrium. 
Substituting (43) into (44) and (45), the incentive constraints for a protocol to be sustained as a social 
norm equilibrium can be finally written as 
 ( ) [ ] ( )[ ]( )
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
o
o
h
h
b r c
c
l ed a d d d a ad
-
+
- -- - ³-- - - , (46) 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1
1
1 1
1 1
o
o
h
h
b r c
bc
l ed a d ld a ad +
- -é ù- - ³ê úë û - - - . (47) 
Since ( ) ( )11 1 1 1 0o oh hd a ad d da d+- - - = - + - > , it can be determined that when 1c
r
e£ - , 
(46) is satisfied. As r  is usually large compared to c  in P2P multimedia services and e  is small, we 
assume that 1c
r
e£ -  and hence (46) always holds. 
By transforming (47), we have that 
 ( )( ) ( )[ ]
1
1
1 1
oh c
r c c
dd a e da
-£ - - - - - . (48) 
Taking logarithm over both sides, we have that 
 ( )( ) ( )[ ]
1
ln 1 / ln
1 1o
c
h
r c c
d da e da
é ù-ê ú³ -ê ú- - - -ë û
. (49) 
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In terms of b , the problem is more complicated since ( )1 1 bla e= - -  is also a function of b . To 
analyze how (47) changes with b , we only have to determine how the following term changes with b  
 ( )( )
( )
( )( )( )1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1o o
b
h b h
l
l
a e
d a ad d d e d+
- -=- - - - + - - - . (50) 
Since ( )1 ble-  monotonically decreases with b , so is (50). Hence, the left-hand side of (47) is a 
decreasing function of b . Therefore, the value of b  should be below certain threshold B  in order for (47) 
to be satisfied. ■ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
As we have shown in Proposition 1, peers’ incentives monotonically increases with oh  and 
monotonically decreases with b . Hence, the pair of design parameters that can maximize peers’ 
incentives is ( ), 1oh L b= = . If the incentive constraint (47) cannot be satisfied in this case, we can then 
draw the conclusion that there exists no protocol that can be sustained as a social norm equilibrium. 
Substituting ( ), 1oh L b= =  into (47), we have that  
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1
1
1 1
1 1
L
L
r c
c
ed e d d e ed +
- -é ù- - ³ê úë û - - - . (51) 
Reorganizing (51), we have that  
 
( )21 1
1 1
L
L
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d e d
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. (52) 
So there exists social norm equilibrium if and only if (52) is satisfied. 
Similarly, we can analyze the relationship between the incentives and the discount factor d . We only 
have to determine the term ( )
1
1
o
o
h
h
d d
d ad d
é ù-ê úë û
- -  changes against d . Taking derivative, we have this term 
monotonically increases with d . ■ 
APPENDIX B 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 
From (20), it can be determined that ( ), 0L bh  and hence ( ),L bh q  for ohq <  monotonically decrease 
with b . Therefore, ,L bm  and so is the social utility ,LU b  monotonically increase with b . ■ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 
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By complying with the protocol, a peer of reputation ohq ³   will become 1q +  after one period with 
probability ( )1 a- , q  with probability 1L qab - + , and 0  with probability ( )11 L qa b - +- . By deviating 
from the protocol, the peer with have reputation q  with probability 1L qb - +  and with reputation 0  with 
probability ( )11 L qb - +- . Hence, the incentive constraint now becomes  
 ( ) { }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 min 1, 1 0L Lv L v v cq qk k kd a q b q b¥ - + ¥ - + ¥é ù- + - - - ³ê úë û , for ohq ³ . (53) 
The left-hand sides of (53) decreases as b  increases. Therefore, peers’ incentive to follow the protocol 
monotonically decreases with b . Hence, there is a threshold sb  for each social strategy s  such that s  
can be sustained in a social norm equilibrium if and only if sb b£ . ■ 
APPENDIX C 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 
Substituting (30) into (37) and (38), the incentive constraints for a protocol to be sustained as a social 
norm equilibrium can be written as 
 ( ) [ ]
( )[ ]
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11 1
1 1
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D D
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As 1
1D D
p
h
m ³ +  and ( )1 r ce- > , (54) always holds. The left-hand side of (55) monotonically 
decrease with Dp . Hence, if a protocol can be sustained as a social norm equilibrium for some Dp , it can 
also be sustained for any 'D Dp p< . ■ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7 
From (37) and (38), it can be determined that ( ) ( )0v vk kq¥ ¥-  monotonically increases with 
( ) ( )0v vk kq -  for any q . Hence, to analyze the impact of Cp  to peers’ incentives, we only have to 
analyze how Cp  influences ( ) ( )0v vk kq - . Since ( ) ( )0 0v vk kq - =  for ohq < , we only have to 
analyze ( ) ( )0v vk kq -  for ohq ³ , which can be written as follows 
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, for ohq ³ . (56) 
It can be determined from (56) that there exists a Cp  such that ( ) ( )0v vk kq -  monotonically 
decreases with Cp  after C Cp p>  . Hence, there also exists a C Cp p£  such that when C Cp p> , 
incentive constraints in (44) and (45) no longer hold. As when 0.5Cp > , ( ) ( )0 0v vk kq - <  for ohq ³  
and incentive constraint (45) does not hold. We conclude that 0.5Cp £ . ■ 
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Figure 1. The schematic representation of a social norm 
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Figure 2. Average utility of reciprocative peers against Dp  and Cp  
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Figure 3. Social utility of all peers against Cp  
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Figure 4. The optimal fraction of altruistic peers *Cp  and the corresponding social utility 
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Figure 5. The protocols’ performance against /c r  and e . 
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Figure 6. The protocols’ performance against b  and l  
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Figure 7. The PSNR of different protocols 
 
APPENDIX F 
TABLES 
Table 1. The utility matrix of a gift-giving game 
 Server 
 S   NS  
Client r , c  0 , 0  
Table 2. The sequence of events in one transaction 
Step 1: A peer, denoted as PeerA, sends a search request of a media chunk to the tracker. 
Step 2: The tracker returns a list of peers who possess the chunk to PeerA. 
Step 3: PeerA randomly selects a peer PeerB from the list to send a download request. 
Step 4: PeerB sends a request to the tracker to look up PeerA’s reputation Aq . 
Step 5: PeerB decides whether to upload the requested chunk to PeerA. 
              If ( A ohq ³  & PeerB uploads the chunk) or ( A ohq <  & PeerB refuses to upload the chunk) 
                            PeerB is regarded as behaving well and f  outputs 0 
              Else 
                            f  outputs 1 
36 
Table 3. The algorithm to solve the problem (OSNE) 
1. Input: ( ), , , , ,r c Le d l  and bˆ , which is the maximum allowed value of b  in the system 
2. If (18) is satisfied and Dd > , the algorithm starts 
3. Initialize: : 1oh = , ˆ:b b= , flag = 0 
4. Procedure: 
5.    While ( oh L£ ) & (flag = 0) do 
6.          While ( 1b ³ ) & (flag = 0) do 
7.                 Set flag = 1 if the protocol with ( ),oh b  is a social norm equilibrium 
8.                 : 1b b= -  
9.          End While 
10.          : 1o oh h= +  
11.    End While 
12.    Set ( ) ( )# #, : 1, 1o oh b h b= - +  
13.    Find: the optimal social norm equilibrium with #oh , set as ( )#,oh b  
14.    Find: the optimal social norm equilibrium with #b , set as ( )#,oh b  
15.    Return: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }# # # #* * , , ,, : argmax , ,o o oo h b h b h bh b U U U=   
16. End Procedure 
Table 4. Decoded Video Quality 
 Decoded Video Quality in PSNR (dB) 
 / 0.1c r = 0.1e =  / 0.3c r = 0.1e = / 0.1c r = 0.3e =  / 0.3c r = 0.3e =
1oh =  39.2 38.2 37.1 36.6 
2oh =  38.7 38.6 36.7 36.2 
3oh =  38.4 36.9 36.9 36.5 
TFT 39.1 33.9 32.2 28.5 
Table 5. The lookup table of the reputation scheme 
Current reputation q 0y =  5y = 10y = 20y =  
0 0 1 2 3 
1 0 2 3 3 
2 0 3 3 3 
3 0 3 3 3 
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